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With the move to “cloud” computing, archivists face the
increasingly difficult task of finding and preserving the
works of an originator so that they may be readily used by
future historians. This paper explores the range of infor-
mation that an originator may have left on computers “out
there on the Internet,” including works that are publicly
identified with the originator; information that may have
been stored using a pseudonym; anonymous blog post-
ings; and private information stored on web-based ser-
vices like Yahoo Calendar and Google Docs. Approaches
are given for finding the content, including interviews,
forensic analysis of the originator’s computer equipment,
and social network analysis. We conclude with a brief
discussion of legal and ethical issues.
Keywords: Forensics, Search, Historical Record, In-
formation Gathering
1 Introduction
With the introduction of home computers and electronic
typewriters in the late 1970s, archivists were forced to
confront the fact that a person’s “papers” might, in fact,
no longer be on paper[29]. The power of word process-
ing made writers among the first to embrace information
technology outside of government and the financial sector.
And because writers often made small purchases and were
not constrained by prior investment, they frequently pur-
chased equipment from small niche manufacturers whose
technology did not become dominant.
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As a result, preserving and cataloging the earliest elec-
tronic records consisted of two intertwined problems: the
task of finding and copying the data off magnetic me-
dia before the media deteriorates, and the challenging of
reading older and sometimes obscure formats that are no
longer in widespread use[1].
Archivists are now on the brink of a far more disrup-
tive change than the transition from paper to electronic
media: the transition from personal to “cloud comput-
ing.” In the very near future an archivist might enter the
office of a deceased writer and find no electronic files
of personal significance: the author’s appointment cal-
endar might split between her organization’s Microsoft
Exchange server and Yahoo Calendar; her unfinished and
unpublished documents stored on Google Docs; her diary
stored at the online LiveJournal service; correspondence
archived on the Facebook “walls” of her close friends; and
her most revealing, insightful and critical comments scat-
tered as anonymous and pseudonymous comments on the
blogs of her friends, collaborators, and rivals.
Although there are numerous public and commercial
projects underway to find and preserve public web-based
content, these projects will not be useful to future histo-
rians if there is no way to readily find the information
that is of interest. And of course, none of the archiving
projects are able to archive content that is private or oth-
erwise restricted—as will increasingly be the case of per-
sonal information that is stored in the “cloud.”
1.1 Outline of this paper
This paper introduces and explores the problem of find-
ing and archiving person’s Internet footprint. In Section 2
we define the term Internet footprint and provide numer-
ous examples of the footprint’s extent. In Section 3 we
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present a variety of approaches for finding the footprint.
In Section 4 we discuss technical concerns for archiving
the footprint.
1.2 Related Work
Web archiving has received significant exploration in re-
cent years, including the use of proxies to collect data[42],
the need for proper record management[41], and the
difficulty of reconstructing lost websites from the web
infrastructure[36]. Researchers have also characterizied
the Web’s “decay”[7]. Jatowt et al. have developed
techniques for automatically detecting the age of a web
page[28].
Juola provides a review of current authorship determi-
nation techniques[30].
There are numerous open source and commercially
available face recognition products, including FaceIt by
Visionics, FavesVACS by Plettac, and ImageWare Soft-
ware. Zhao et al. [50] and Datta et al. [15] have both
published comprehensive surveys of current research and
technology.
Vie´gas et al. examined cooperation and conflict
between authors by analyzing Wikipedia logs[48].
Other relevant work on Wikipedia includes analysis of
participation[9] and statistical models that can predict fu-
ture administrators[11].
2 The Internet Footprint
Consider the staggering range of Internet services that a
person uses during the course of a year. Some of these
are public publication services like BBC or CNN News—
services that are little more than traditional television, ra-
dio or newspaper repurposed to the Internet, and that most
Internet users access anonymously. Other services are
public and highly personalized—blogs and home pages,
for example. Still other services are private and personal,
like an online calendar or diary. These services can be
operated by an organization for its employees, such as a
company running a Microsoft Exchange server, or they
can be operated on a global scale for millions of users,
such as Google Calendar[23].
This section considers the wide range of information
that an originator may create in other computers on the In-
ternet through their own actions—the originator’s Internet
Footprint.
2.1 The Public Identified Footprint
A person’s public identified footprint is any information
that they created which is online, widely available, and
specifically linked to author’s real name.
For originators that are authors, their public footprint
almost certainly includes articles that have been published
under the originator’s own name in web-only publications
such as Slate Magazine[5] or Salon.com[4]. The public
footprint may also include letters to the editor. (John Up-
dike once wrote a letter to the editor of the Boston Globe
advocating that the comics page retain “Spiderman[47].”)
Individuals may also publish their own writing on per-
sonal web sites (“home pages” and “blogs”).
Websites cannot be relied upon to archive their ownma-
terial, because the websites may not exist in the future.
For example, in the late 1990s thousands of articles and
columns by leading writers were published at HotWired, a
web property operated by Wired News. Wired News was
eventually sold to Lycos, then to Conde Nast[38]. Numer-
ous articles were lost during these transfers; those that are
still available online are not at their original Internet lo-
cation (http://www.hotwired.com), but are now
housed underneath the http://www.wired.com do-
main. Many links to, between and even within the articles
have been broken as a result.
One way to retrieve no longer extant web pages is
through the use of the Internet “WayBackMachine,” oper-
ated by the Internet Archive[3]. But here there are several
problems:
• The Internet Archive is itself another organization (in
this case a for-profit business) which may cease op-
eration at some point in the future.
• The Archive’s coverage is necessarily incomplete.
• The Internet Archive may not be accurate. (Fred
Cohen has demonstrated that the content of “past”
pages on the Internet Way Back machine can be ma-
nipulated from the future—a disturbing fact when
one considers that the reports from WayBack ma-
chine have been entered into evidence in legal cases
without challenge from opposing counsel[13].)
• TheWayBack machine will not archive websites that
are blocked with an appropriate robots exclusion file
robots.txt. This was especially a problem for
the “Journalspace” online journal, which was wiped
out on January 2, 2009 due to an operator error and
the lack of backups[43]. As it turns out, Journalspace
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had a robots.txt file that prohibited archiving by
services such as Internet Archive and Google.
Rather than hoping that another organization has managed
to sweep up an individual’s relevant web pages in a global
cataloging of the Internet, it almost certainly makes more
sense for archivists to go out and get the material them-
selves.
The Public Footprint may also contain information at
social networking websites such as Facebook, MySpace
and LinkedIn. These websites contains not just informa-
tion that a person posted, but documentation of a person’s
social network—their “friends” and associates—as well
as documentation of a person’s preferences in the form
of “recommendations” messages. Websites such as Flickr
and Picassa hold photographs that a person may have up-
loaded. What a treasure for future historians trying to un-
derstand the life of an individual! What a quandary for an
archivist, for these websites actively encourage origina-
tors to intermix the personal and the professional. Only
through consultation with families and other interested
parties will archivists be able to determine which “per-
sonal” information should be made immediately avail-
able, which information should be kept in closed collec-
tions until a suitable amount of time has passed, and what
should be destroyed.
Finally, a person’s public footprint might contain infor-
mation that the person thinks is private but which is, in
fact, public. It is notoriously difficult to audit security set-
tings because they are complex and not generally apparent
within today’s user interfaces. As a result, it is common
for computer users to make information publicly available
when they do not intend to do so. Good and Krekelberg
explored the Kazaa user interface and discovered that it
was relatively easy for individuals to “share” their entire
hard drive to a file sharing network when they intended
to just share a few documents or folders[22]. Sometimes
such inadvertent public sharing can have important polit-
ical, social, or historical dimensions: in June 2008, Judge
Alex Kozinski of the 9th US Circuit Court of Appeals
was found to have sexually explicit photos and videos on
his own personal website[31, 33]1—relevant, as the Judge
was himself overseeing an obscenity trial.
1Later the Judge defending himself saying that much of the material
attributed to him by the Los Angeles Times had actually been posted by
his son[25].
2.2 The Organizational Footprint
Although not strictly part of the “Internet” footprint, many
organizations operate their own data services on which an
originator could easily store information. For example,
many businesses and organizations run their own web-
based calendar and email services. These services may
also cause problems for archivists because they can be
hard to find and may not be readily interested in sharing
their information—even when the originator or the origi-
nator’s family strongly favor information sharing.
2.3 The Pseudonymous Footprint
Beyond the information that a person published under
their own name, there is potentially a wealth of informa-
tion that is publicly available but published under a differ-
ent name or a non-standard email address—an electronic
pseudonym.
There are may reasons why an individual might publish
information to the public using a pseudonym:
• Information might be published under a different
name in an attempt to preserve privacy.
• The individual might have a well-established pen
name (for example, Charles Lutwidge Dodgson
blogging as Lewis Caroll).
• The individual might be a fiction writer and be pub-
lishing the information online using the persona of a
fictional character (for example, Dodgson blogging
as the Queen of Hearts).
• The information might appear in an online forum
where there is a community norm that prohibits pub-
lishing information under a “real name,” or the on-
line forum might assign pseudonyms as a matter of
course.
• Another person might already be using the individ-
ual’s name, forcing the originator to pick a different
name.
• The individual might be a government or corporate
official and be prohibited from posting under their
own name for policy reasons. (For example, Whole
Foods President John P. Mackey blogged under the
pseudonym Rahobed, a play on his wife’s name
Deborah[35].)
Information that an originator publishes on the Inter-
net in a manner that is freely available but is not directly
linked to the person’s name can be thought of as the indi-
vidual’s Pseudonymous Footprint. It is unlikely that all of
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an originator’s pseudonyms would be known in advance
by an archivist: many people don’t even remember all of
the pseudonyms that they themselves use!
Pseudonyms have many characteristics that are sure to
cause problems for future archivists:
• Although each pseudonym is typically used by a sin-
gle person, this is not necessarily the case.
• Although some pseudonyms are long-lived, others
may be created for a single purpose and then quickly
discarded.
• Pseudonyms may be linguistically similar to the
originator’s name, similar to another person’s name,
or they may be unique.
• There is no central registry of pseudonyms.
• Some pseudonyms may be confined to a single on-
line service, while others may be used between mul-
tiple services.
• The same pseudonym on different services may in
fact be used by different people (e.g. while the
user “rahobed” on Yahoo Finance bulletin was used
by John P. Mackey, the blog http://rahobed.
blogspot.com/ actually belongs to one of the
authors of this article.
• Pseudonyms that appear linked to email addresses
(e.g. rahobed@yahoo.com) need not be: some
online services allow any text string to be used as
a username, and usernames that look like email ad-
dresses are not verified.
Automated tools may assist the researcher in at-
tempting to determine if a pseudonym is or is not the
originator[30]. In the case of photos, face recogni-
tion/matching software could be used.
2.4 The Anonymous Footprint
Anonymous works are fundamentally different from
pseudonymous works. With pseudonymous messages
there is at least a name (“Lewis Carroll”) that the archivist
can use to link a work to the true author. But for works
that are truly anonymous, the only information that can
link the work with the author is the content of the work
itself.
Although the Internet originally had many outlets for
anonymous speech, these systems received significant
abuse as the Internet’s popularity grew in the 1990s[26,
37]. As a result today’s Internet has surprisingly few out-
lets for speech and messages that are truly anonymous.
2.5 The Private Footprint
Increasingly computer users are storing information on
remote servers rather than on their own systems. Such
services are sometimes called “grid,” “cluster” or “cloud
computing.” Although these are online services, they are
frequently used for private use. Individuals prefer them to
using personally owned computer systems because of data
durability (users don’t need to back up their own data),
and cost (most of the web-based services are free). An-
other advantage is that the systems make it relatively easy
to collaborate with a small number of people.
Some examples of these services includes:
• Calender services (e.g. Google Calendar and Yahoo
Calendar), which allows a person to have an online
calendar.
• Online word processors and spreadsheets, such as
Google Docs, and ThinkFree Boundless,
• Livejournal, a blogging service, which also allows
for the creation of a private diary or a password-
protected journal that is shared with a small number
of people.
• Online banking and bill payment services. Whereas
traditionally a person might have kept their own fi-
nancial records, increasingly individuals are opting
to receive “e-statements.” Although e-statements
could be sent by email, in practice the statements are
not sent at all. Instead the bank or financial institu-
tion sends a message stating that the statement may
be viewed on a website. Most users do not download
a copy, but simply refer to the online version when
they need to.
Access to online private services is typically protected
with a username and a password. Most services allow
users to register and email address; if a password is lost, a
new password can be generated and sent to the address.
Also part of the private footprint are Internet services
that do not appear as content at all—but which can be
vital to understanding a person’s approach to the online
world. Two examples come to mind:
1. For example, Individuals can obtain domain name
and populate the Domain Name System (DNS)
database with a variety of types of information. Any
attempt to capture Internet services which does not
capture DNS is necessarily incomplete and may even
be erroneous.But capturing only DNS is insufficient:
there is necessarily a link between DNS names, IP
4
addresses, and geographical locations. Thus, in
order to make sense of DNS information, it may
be necessary to perform other operations such as
geolocation[24] or cryptographic operations[16].
2. Much collaborative work that takes place on the In-
ternet today is the collaborative creation of open
source computer programs. These systems reside on
servers such as SourceForge and Google Code, as
well as on privately-managed CVS and Subversion
servers. This code is generally not archived or in-
dexed by existing search engines or web archiving
projects, but may nevertheless have significant his-
torical importance.
3 Finding the Footprint
As the previous section shows, simply mapping out the
potential of a person’s Internet Footprint is quite difficult.
Actually finding it is more difficult still.
We have identified three approaches for finding an In-
ternet Footprint: forensic analysis of an originator’s com-
puter system; search; and social network analysis.
3.1 Interviews with the Originator
Ideally, the originator or the originator’s family will
be able to provide a list of online services, complete
with usernames and passwords, to enable the expeditious
downloading and archiving of information stored on re-
mote services. Such a list should also come with signed
consent giving full authorization for the accounts to be
used for the downloading of the information that they con-
tain (see Section 5.1).
But even if the originator is alive and cooperating, it is
unlikely that the originator will be able to provide a com-
plete list of online information—most of us are simply
unaware of all the various online services that we use on a
daily basis. Finally, there is always the risk that the orig-
inator will have died without clearly documenting what
online services were used. Even if the originator’s family
wishes to assist the archivist, they may be unable to do so.
Interviews may also be conducted with the originator’s
family and friends to see if they know of any online re-
sources used by the originator.
3.2 Forensic Analysis
One of the most direct ways to identify an originator’s
Internet footprint is to conduct a forensic analysis of the
originator’s computers and other electronic devices.
Computer systems preserve many traces or remnants
that are indicative of Internet activity:
• Web browsers maintain bookmarks and caches of
web pages. Web pages may also be recovered from
deleted files.
• Email messages are rich with references to online
services in the form of emails containing links, noti-
fications, password reset instructions.
• Address books may contain URLs and are frequently
used to hold user names and passwords as well.
• Calendars may contain URLs and online information
in their desktop calendars.
• Other references may be found in logfiles and even
word processing documents.
Much of these references can be found by making a
forensic copy of the originator’s computer and all asso-
ciated media (tapes, CD/DVDs, external drives etc), and
then scanning the resulting disk images with a forensic
feature extractor[19]. We have developed a primitive ex-
tractor called bulk_extractor which can produce a
report of all email addresses and URLs found on an orig-
inator’s hard drive. An example of the report of this pro-
gram is shown in Figure 1.
Unfortunately, while some of an originator’s account
names, aliases, and pseudonyms may be present on the
originator’s machine, others may not be. The originator
may have explicitly attempted to hide them, or may have
accessed them exclusively from another machine, or they
may have been used so long ago that references to the
accounts have been overwritten.
The forensic analysis process should be completed with
care not to alter or otherwise disturb the information on
the originator’s equipment. In general there are three key
requirements which must be adhered to when conducting
the analysis:
1. The entire storage space of the originator’s computer
and associated media should be captured, not merely
the individual files. If possible, all attempts to copy
data from the originator’s computer should be done
with a hardware write blocker in place between the
computer and the storage media. This will ensure
that data is not accidentally written to the originator’s
storage devices during the imaging process.
Complete imaging of the originator’s computer will
establish the provenance of the captured material and
address concerns of authenticity. These concerns are
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Input file: /Users/simsong/M57 Jean.vmwarevm/Windows XP Clean-s001.vmdk
Starting page number: 0
Last processed page number: 90
Time: Fri Jan 16 11:59:27 2009




































Figure 1: The first page of output from bulk extractor program; the actual output runs more than 40 pages.
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similar to those of legal authorities[2]. It may also
result in data being preserved that would otherwise
be lost—for example, residual data in deleted web
browser cache files may contain important clues for
uncovering pseudonyms used by the originator.
2. Data, once captured, should be “hashed,” or cryp-
tographically fingerprinted, with a strong algorithm
such as SHA1 or SHA256. (MD5 is no longer suf-
ficient as the algorithm has been compromised[49].)
Even better, the image can be digitally signed and/or
encrypted using a system such as the Advanced
Forensic Format (AFF)[21].
3. In addition to a sector-by-sector copy of the stor-
age media, it may be desirable to make a file-by-
file copy. This will both assure that there are two
copies of each file (one in the disk image and one
in the copy), and will also decrease demands for the
use of forensic tools. Also, in some cases, forensic
tools may not be able to extract information from the
disk images. (For example, in some cases it is not
possible to easily reconstruct a multi-drive RAID or
encrypted file system. In these cases it is easiest to
use the host operating system to make a file-by-file
copy.)
3.3 Search and Social Network Analysis
Another way to locate the originator’s Internet footprint
is by searching for it. Two kinds of search are possible.
First, the archivist could simply search for the origina-
tor’s name (or aliases) on Internet search systems such as
Google and Yahoo. Second, the archivist could go specif-
ically to websites such as Facebook, MySpace and Flickr,
and conduct searches there.
Search is complicated by the fact that many people
share the same name. Bekkerman and McCallum note
that a search for the name “David Mulford” on Google
correctly retrieves information about a US Ambassador
to India, “two business managers, a musician, a student,
a scientist, and a few others”—all people who share the
same name[8]. Which David Mulford is the “right” David
Mulford depends on which one the context of the search.
Sometimes it is difficult to determine if two seemly dif-
ferent individuals are in fact the same person. Consider
again the search for “David Mulford:”
“It is sometimes quite difficult to determine if
a page is about a particular person or not. In
case of Ambassador David Mulford, much of
the information that can be found at first may
seem to be unrelated: one site states that in
the late 1950s David attended Lawrence Uni-
versity and was a member of its athletic team;
other sites mention his work at different po-
sitions in governmental departments and com-
mercial structures, including Chairman Interna-
tional of Credit Suisse First Boston (CSFB) in
London; a few sites (mostly in Spanish) relate
his name to a financial scandal in Argentina.
It is a diffcult challenge to automatically deter-
mine whether all of these sites discuss the same
person.”[8]
The archivist can also try to find an originator’s Internet
footprint by searching the websites belonging to the origi-
nator’s known friends and relations and looking for links.
In some cases it may be appropriate to directly email indi-
viduals in the originator’s address book or social network
to see if they have information that they wish to share with
the archivist.
Once references are found, it might be useful to sort
these references into a variety of categories. We suggest
three:
Provable References Known references could be indi-
cated by the presence of a username/password com-
bination which maps directly to a specific website
and can be validated by testing to see if the account
can still be accessed.
Reliable References A reliable reference could be indi-
cated by the presence of an alias and URL/cookie
combination but does not include a password, pre-
venting the researcher from actually testing the ac-
count.
Passing References A passing reference could be indi-
cated by the presence of a URL or cookie which
points to a social networking site or internet e-mail
site. The difference here is that there is only one in-




3.4.1 Comments, Tracebacks, and Diggs
Now, think back to the BBC and CNN news sites. Al-
though these services seem to be anonymous publication
services, increasingly these services are places where an
originator may leave an Internet footprint. BBC’s website
allows users to create a membership, “Sign In” and leave
comments on every story. Comments are displayed with
the user’s “member name” which is unique. an originator
might use his or her real name as a member name. Alter-
natively, the originator might use a pseudonym (or multi-
ple pseudonyms) which might or might not be similar to
the originator’s real name. A future biographer trying to
build a picture of the originator might be very interested in
the comments that the person thought to leave on the BBC
website—putting those comments in context requires not
just archiving them, but archiving the original story and
the other comments as well.
CNN also allows readers to post a comment (or “Sound
Off,” to use CNN’s term). But CNN also allows users to
share articles on services such as Mixx, Digg, Facebook,
del.icio.us, reddit, StumbleUpon, and MySpace. “Shar-
ing” means that a reference to the article, and the user’s
comments about the article, are cross-posted to another
web-based service.
3.4.2 “Report as Offensive” and Edit Wars
Another complication is that user contributions may be
removed by other users. Web sites have given users this
power to manage the torrents of spam and inappropri-
ate comments that many high-profile websites receive.
For example, the BBC website allows users to “Com-
plain about this comment” (Figure 3), and Craigslist al-
lows comments to be flagged as “miscategorized,” “pro-
hibited,” or “spam/overpost” (Figure 2). Many websites
will automatically remove user-generated comment that
is flagged by more than a certain number of people.
On Wikipedia it is even easier to change an originator’s
words—they can simply be edited by other Wikipedia
users. This is particularly problematic when people are
contributing to articles that are controversial. Imagine
a noted author or historian locked in a bitter “edit war”
with some other Wikipedia user, with each editing and
re-editing the works of the other. Then the noted historian
dies. With no one left to defend the historian’s intellectual
space, the pages get rewritten or even marked for deletion
Figure 2: Postings to Craiglist may one day provide fasci-
nating contemporanious documents of the career of writ-
ers or artists.
and are eventually removed from the system. From the
point of view of Wikipedia policy this is the correct out-
come, as a Wikipedia article is supposed to represent a
consensus truth that can be verified from external sources
and for which the author has no vested interest[20].
3.4.3 Privacy Enhancing Technologies
The originator may have employed various privacy en-
hancing technologies (PETs) such as encryption or
anonymity services during their lifetime. Such services,
unfortunately, may also prevent the analysis of their com-
puter systems by archivists after the originator’s death.
This can be a problem even if the analysis is performed
with the full consent of the originator’s family.
For example, data may be encrypted, either on the orig-
inator’s home computer system or on remote servers. In
recent years high-quality encryption has been built into
consumer operating system (for example, Apple’s File-
Vault). There are also a small number of Internet service
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Figure 3: The BBC website allows users to complain about
comments left from other users.
providers that offer to store information in an encrypted
form so that not even the provider can access it (for ex-
ample, HushMail offers encryption of email, while Iron
Mountain Digital Services offers encryption of backups.)
Encryption may be subverted through the analysis of
the originator’s own computer systems, as sometimes
people store passwords and encryption keys for remote
systems on their local computers. Programs such as Ac-
cessData’s Forensic Tool Kit and Password Recovery Tool
Kit can work together to scan a hard drive for proper
names, use this information to try to forcibly decrypt, or
“crack,” the encrypted data. The company’s Distributed
Network Attack can run the attack simultaneously on hun-
dreds of computers to dramatically increase speed.
Crack today or crack tomorrow? Archivists have an in-
teresting dilemma when attempting to decrypt encrypted
data. In most cases it becomes easier to forcibly de-
crypt encrypted data as each year computers get faster and
new techniques are discovered for cracking. On the other
hand, a lessor-known encryption technique may conceiv-
ably become more difficult to decrypt with the passage of
time as the number of people familiar with the specific
technique dwindles. It is possible that a weak but obscure
algorithm that is crackable today will not be readily crack-
able in the future without significant re-investment in re-
search as the specific knowledge of the vulnerability is
lost.
3.4.4 Uncooperative Service Providers
There is an old story of an assistant at MIT who worked
for a famous professor in one of the physical science de-
partments. One day the professor died after a long illness.
Shortly thereafter, the assistant received a phone call from
the Institute Archivist who wanted to stop by and eval-
uate the professor’s papers. The assistant said that she
had been expecting the archivist and had already “cleaned
them up” in anticipation of the visit. When the archivist
arrived the extent of the cleaning became evident: the as-
sistant had thrown out the professor’s scratch pads, his
doodles, a box of business receipts, and so on, and pre-
pared for the archivist a neat folder showing all of the
professor’s speeches, published articles, and honors. The
archivist was devastated.
Although many archivists know that they may need to
act with haste in order to preserve the physical papers of
the deceased, this story of the archivist and the assistant
is in danger of playing out with great frequency in tomor-
row’s cloud-based world of electronic records.
For example, photo sharing websites such as AOL Pic-
tures have deleted uploaded pictures that are not viewed
after 60 days, or when the owner of the account fails to
log in after 90 days. Some services delete photos when
monthly fees are no longer paid[10]. Archivists would
need to move fast to rescue an originator’s photos stored
on such a service.
Facebook’s policy is to place the profile of members
who die into a Memorial State. “In Memorial State, the
account is given stronger privacy settings (only friends
can see the profile), the person is removed from any
groups and the status is taken away. This policy is the
same across the board. If the family would rather the pro-
file be taken down, we will do so,” stated Malorie Lucich,
a spokesperson for the company[34].
But Facebook’s only changes the account to memory
state if someone brings to Facebook’s attention that a
member has died. Meanwhile, an article at the University
of Georgia’s newspaper details how parents of deceased
students have taken over their Facebook accounts, using
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the service as a means for memorializing their children
and getting to know their children’s friends[27].
4 Archiving the Footprint
Information must be archived once it is discovered.
Archiving involves two distinction processes: getting the
content, and saving the content.
4.1 Getting the content
Once the references have been cataloged, the archivist
must then begin the task of extracting content from the
Internet and saving it in an archival form. The archivist
can manually log into the remote websites to access the
information or, more likely, run some kind of modified
web crawler (e.g. [39]) to do the work.
For historic purposes it will almost always be desir-
able to store the original web page. However, since
many web pages are likely to contain extraneous infor-
mation (e.g. advertisements and navigation elements), it
may also be desirable to automatically extract the rele-
vant portions of a web using a “wrapper” or information
extractor. Generally though these tools are hand written
to suit a specific web site and do not scale or transfer
well from page to page. Fortunately, tools have been pro-
posed to better address the issues associated with wrapper
development, including W4F (World Wide Web Wrap-
per Factory)[44], Rapier (Robust Automated Production
of Information Extraction)[12] or NoDoSE (Northwest-
ern Document Structure Extractor)[6].
HTML-aware tools, like W4F, typically provide a
higher degree of automation; however, the consistent use
of HTML tags on target pages is required. Tools which
are based on Natural Language Processing (NLP), such
as RAPIER, can be classified as semi-automatic because
though the wrapper is generated automatically a user
needs to provide examples to guide the it. It is up to the
researcher to choose (or develop) the appropriate tool. (A
comprehensive list of information extraction approaches
can be found in [46].)
Reliable References will require a more hands on ap-
proach. This category will require the archivist to man-
ually navigate to the website and identify whether or not
it is historically interesting. If it is deemed so then the
tools discussed in the previous category may certainly be
used to extract appropriate content ensuring that appro-
priate steps are taken to maintain an original copy and
integrity assurances.
The third category, Passing References, will require
significant time and effort on the part of the historian
and it is anticipated that the level of automation will de-
crease. Since the historian is provide little information
on which to go on exhaustive manual searches of both lo-
cal and deep/hidden content will be required. For public
content the use of traditional search engines, like Google
and Yahoo, and Webcrawlers, like Webcrawler.com and
DataRover could be utilized. As local search engines in-
dex mostly based on hyperlinks which include location
information they typically exclude high quality “local”
content available in the Deep Web[40]. Deep Web crawl-
ing may be accomplished through the use of tools such
as Deep Web Crawler and LocalDeepBot. Additionally,
Hidden Web Agents may be used as well. These agents
can search and collect information on pages outside the
Publically Indexable Web (PIW)[32].
4.2 Saving the content
While there are many different ways to archive web con-
tent, each has significant technical problems.
There are several fundamental problems in making an
archival copy of a web page:
• Because web pages can appear differently on dif-
ferent computers, it is not clear what should be
archived—a picture of the web page, or the HTML
code of a web page?
• Web sites such as Facebook and LiveJournal may
show web pages differently depending on who is
logged in. Should the web page be archived as it
appear to the author, to a person in the author’s cir-
cle of “friends,” to an un-friended registered user, or
as it appear if no one is logged in?
• Alternatively, web sites may display pages differ-
ently at different times of day, or change their
“theme” to take into account current events. If there
are significant time-dependent changes, should mul-
tiple copies be archived?
Once the archivist decides what should be archived, the
next question to answer is how should it be archived.
The naı¨ve approach for archiving web content is to print
it. While archivists generally frown on this approach, be-
cause all it does is exchange one set of problems for an-
other.
Instead of printing to paper, the web page could be
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“printed” to a bitmap file (e.g. a TIFF or PNG). Such files
produce an exact copy of what was seen on the screen—
at least for one specific web browser—but they cannot be
readily searched unless they are OCRed. Such scans do,
however, meet the legal requirements for admission to the
US courts[17].
Another approach is to “print” the web content to
Adobe Acrobat (PDF) format. But PDF is an evolving
standard: PDF documents created today may look differ-
ently in 10 years with a different Acrobat reader. Acro-
bat has specifically had problems with documents that had
embedded bitmap fonts (especially documents created by
versions of LATEX in the 1980s and 1990s) and documents
authored in languages other than English which did not
have embedded fonts[45].
5 Legal Issues
There are primarily two legal issues that could arise dur-
ing the conduct of the collection of Internet works be-
ing proposed in this paper: violations of copyright law,
and violations of computer crime statutes such as the US
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, or the UK Computer
Misuse Act. There are also a number of ethical issues
that might arise as well.
5.1 Copyright and Terms of Use
Copyright law, at least in the United States, is generally
quite receptive to archives made for scholarly purposes,
especially when the archiving is done for non-commercial
purpose and in such a way that the value of the original
copyrighted work is not compromised. In such a case,
copies are typically allowed under the “Fair Use” doctrine
(17 U.S.C. §106); similar Fair Use is allowed under other
copyright regimes as well.
Despite Fair Use, many web publishers and online ser-
vices are generally not receptive to having their con-
tent scraped, spidered, or otherwise archived. For ex-
ample, Facebook’s Terms of Use (Figure 4)clearly pro-
hibits archiving an originators Facebook postings by any-
one other than the person herself; whether or not this per-
mission would apply to the person’s estate or an archivist
acting on behalf of the person or estate is unclear. How-
ever, the policy is very clear that Facebook would not per-
mit an archivist or historian to archive and then display
messages that others had posted on the originator’s Face-
book “wall,” or messages that the person had received,
“No Site Content may be modified, copied, dis-
tributed, framed, reproduced, republished, down-
loaded, scraped, displayed, posted, transmitted, or sold
in any form or by any means, in whole or in part,
without the Company’s prior written permission, ex-
cept that the foregoing does not apply to your own User
Content (as defined below) that you legally post on the
Site. Provided that you are eligible for use of the Site,
you are granted a limited license to access and use the
Site and the Site Content and to download or print a
copy of any portion of the Site Content to which you
have properly gained access solely for your personal,
non-commercial use, provided that you keep all copy-
right or other proprietary notices intact. Except for
your own User Content, you may not upload or re-
publish Site Content on any Internet, Intranet or Ex-
tranet site or incorporate the information in any other
database or compilation, and any other use of the Site
Content is strictly prohibited[18].”
Figure 4: This section of Facebook’s Terms of Use would
seem to prohibit the archiving of a person’s Facebook pro-
file for historical purposes.
or how the originator’s Facebook presence existed in the
context of other Facebook profiles.
5.2 Computer Crime
Even if an archivist decided that it is legally permissible to
archive the content that an originator may have stored in
the “Internet cloud,” the way that the archivist goes about
performing this function may expose the archivist to crim-
inal charges.
For example, although it may be possible to scan an
originator’s hard drive for the username and password to
an online service, actually using that username and pass-
word may put the archivist in violation of computer crime
statutes such as the US Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
(CFAA) (18 USC §1030). Such violations may be direct,
as the CFA prohibits “unauthorized access” to comput-
ers involved in interstate commerce. But violations may
also be indirect, the result of violating a website’s “Terms
of Service” under a growing interperation of the CFAA
which holds individuals criminally liable for using a web-
site in a manner other than that which was envisioned by
its the website’s owner[14].
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5.3 Ethical Issues
Computer systems have the potential to record more in-
formation, retain it for a longer period of time, and make
it available to more individuals than is possible with pa-
per works. More than ever, every effort should be made
to clearly differentiate between what is public and what
is private information. This is especially the case when
collecting from online information systems, since there
is the chance that the information collected may belong
to another person (in the case of a mistaken identity), or
may involve other people (in the case of a social network
website).
The problem of mistaken identity is especially prob-
lematic for online data collection. There is little chance
when going through a person’s office that the archivist
will accidently pick up and catalog a diary belonging to
a person who has the same name but who lives in another
country—but this is exactly what can happen when down-
loading a originator’s online diary.
6 Conclusion
It is no longer sufficient to simply analyze local com-
puters and associated media when attempting to catalog
a persons life works. Ever increasingly communication,
personal documents and published works are migrating to
the web space. Social Networking sites contain photos,
videos and personal communication. Blog sites contain
personal ramblings and commentaries; named and anony-
mous. E-mail and chat as well as personal videos are also
migrating to the web. The archivist of the present must be
technically savvy and be able to use the myriad of foren-
sic analysis, web searching and cataloging tools in order
to be efficient and create a complete set of works.
Many of the approaches discussed in this paper need
not be confined to the archivist profession. Individuals
can apply these approaches on themselves to determine
the extent of their own digital shadow. These approaches
may also be useful in civil litigation for e-discovery, and
even in law enforcement.
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